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2 1. Challenges in times of crisis 
 
The development of monetary theory and monetary policy over  time reflects the 
interaction between central banks, the political and financial system, and research.
1 
“[T]he choice of measure of value, of a monetary system, of currency and credit 
legislation – all are in the hands of society … Here, then, the rulers of society have 
an opportunity of showing their economic wisdom – or folly. Monetary history reveals 
the fact that folly has frequently been paramount;  for it describes many fateful 
mistakes” (Wicksell, 1906, p. 314). Times of crisis present a special challenge. The 
financial crisis starting in 2007 unavoidably  triggered memories of the Great 
Depression and its dire economic, political and social consequences. From the many 
studies on that period, the clear message that emerged was: the follies of that time 
must be avoided, and the world must be saved from a repetition of that disaster. As a 
result, all major central banks reduced their interest rates to exceptionally low levels. 
In fact, the expansionary monetary policy was extended beyond the zero bound by 
also implementing several kinds of so-called “unorthodox” measures. At the same 
time, a broad discussion has started on a number of issues: 
•  What are the achievements of these policies?  What are the risks?  How  long 
should the period of extremely expansionary policy last? (Section 2) 
•  Should central banks change their strategies? (Section 3) 
o  Do we need a new paradigm for the conduct of monetary policy? 
o  What should central banks’ mandate be? 
o  What is the role of central banks in the area of financial stability? 
•  Do we need a new institutional arrangement for central banks? What about their 
independent status? (Section 4) 
 
 
 
1 For a discussion on developments in Germany, see Issing and Wieland (2013). 
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                                                           2. Achievements and risks 
 
The timely reaction of monetary policy to the crisis in 2008 prevented the collapse 
and deep problems of financial institutions from plunging the real economy into a 
situation like that of the 1930s. True, output fell and unemployment increased sharply 
in many countries. Nowhere, however, did the negative outcome reach the dimension 
of the Great Depression. (In terms of unemployment and recession, some countries 
of the euro area come close to that experience – but for a different reason.) 
Central banks have learned from the past and thus avoided the mistakes of their 
predecessors. One could indeed hardly imagine that they would not have learnt this 
lesson. However, while  this reaction was extremely important, from a longer-term 
perspective it represents the easier part.  
Approaching the zero bound for interest rate policy, central banks have expanded 
their balance sheets  via measures termed  “unorthodox” because they were not 
adopted before. While  the  policies applied had different forms,  the overall 
macroeconomic goal was to stimulate the economy by  lowering market interest 
rates.
2  Whereas the initial programs of quantitative easing presumably had a 
substantial impact on lowering long-term interest rates there exists wide 
disagreement on the durability of this effect and the consequences of the 
continuation of this policy (Martin and Milas 2012). Uncertainty about the longer-run 
effect is, of course,  even  greater  and, thus, makes an  assessment of  the  overall 
benefits and costs of these policies at this stage anything but easy (Bernanke 2012). 
The fundamental critique of the Fed’s unorthodox policy by Allan Meltzer (2012) 
stresses the short-term orientation based on shaky data, reliance on the Phillips 
curve and disregard for money, credit and asset prices, i.e. conducting a purely 
discretionary policy. This is also the main point of criticism of John Taylor (2012).  
Two  more  aspects are also relevant. One is the potential undermining of fiscal 
discipline,  and the other is  the  redistributive or rather discriminatory effects of 
2 The specific measures adopted by the ECB were different in nature insofar as they were aimed at supporting 
the transmission mechanism by stabilizing the banking system. 
 
 
4 
                                                           purchasing specific assets. These are general problems that go along with 
quantitative easing.  
Changing the course of monetary policy is always a difficult task: not too late – not 
too early, in small steps or with a decisive move? However, exit from unorthodox 
measures is a daunting challenge for several reasons. In the context of the zero 
bound it is very difficult to calculate the monetary policy stance and the impact of any 
changes – withdrawing liquidity and/or raising interest rates? How will markets react? 
When the central bank starts selling assets, is this not a signal to private agents to 
sell their assets outright before asset prices plummet? If the central bank tries to 
smooth this process – probably also under pressure from fiscal authorities – will this 
not be seen as accepting the emergence of inflationary pressures with consequences 
for inflation expectations, thereby causing  even stronger  increases  in  longer-term 
interest rates? 
This process is complicated by the fact that a period of extremely low interest rates 
contributes to higher risk-taking, masks underlying weaknesses in balance sheets 
and prevents restructuring of the financial sector (Borio 2012). The impact on savings 
and insurance companies over time might become dramatic. The whole process of 
allocation of capital is heavily distorted. These undesirable medium-term effects are 
the unintended consequences of ultra-easy monetary policies (White 2012). 
An extended period of very low interest rates makes the financial sector more and 
more vulnerable to a change of regime. The central bank will have to consider these 
risks  of getting out  of  the zero bound  and unorthodox measures. Extremely low 
interest rates also have an effect on government. They are hardly conducive to fiscal 
discipline. And huge  stocks of government bonds expose the central bank to 
economic risks and political pressure. Paradoxical  as it seems,  the very 
consequence of large unorthodox measures by central banks could be to contribute 
to or even create a situation of fiscal dominance (Sargent and Wallace 1981). 
Altogether, monetary policy might be “cornered”  by the financial sector and fiscal 
authorities (Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2012). 
These are strong arguments for being concerned about an extended period of 
extremely low interest rates. Under these circumstances, when should the central 
 
 
5 bank consider raising  interest rates? The answer depends crucially on the 
assessment of the economic situation and implicit risks to price stability. 
Where economic problems are caused by a collapse of financial markets, the result 
is much different from a “normal” cyclical downturn (Reinhart and Rogoff 2003). If 
economic problems are not of a monetary nature (Meltzer 2012), there is certainly no 
argument for further quantitative easing. Given the situation as of today, the case for 
ending the period of zero interest rates becomes more and more relevant (Taylor 
2013). 
 
 
3. Time inconsistency, commitment and communication 
 
Central banks have reacted to  the crisis with  manifold  ad hoc measures. A vast 
literature on time inconsistency problems (Kydland and Prescott 1977) and credibility 
as well as experience with policy give a strong warning that pure discretion will lead 
to uncertainty and volatility. One attempt to overcome this situation and to anchor 
expectations is by the use of “forward guidance” as a policy tool. Bernanke (2012, 
p.9) has explained that this “is not an unconditional promise”, but rather, “a statement 
about the FOMC’s collective judgment regarding the path of policy that is likely to 
prove appropriate, given the Committee’s objectives and its outlook for the 
economy”. On the other hand, the Committee announced its intention “to continue 
buying MBS and other assets until it sees a substantial improvement in the outlook 
for  the  labor market”, “stated  that it expects a highly accommodative  stance  of 
monetary policy to remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic 
recovery strengthens” and “that it currently expects to hold the federal funds rate at 
exceptionally low levels at least through mid-2015…” (Yellen 2012, p.2). 
However, the fundamental problem lies in this approach itself. Forward guidance 
suffers from the same sort of time inconsistency malaise it intends to remedy. Saying 
that the policy rate is likely to be low well into the future does not imply that the 
central bank, from the perspective of a future date and in the face of rising inflation, 
will have the incentive to follow through on its commitment. The reason being that at 
 
 
6 this moment in the future it will be confronted with all the costs associated with 
keeping its promise while the benefits will have been reaped in the past. In fact, this 
forward guidance is very prone to time inconsistency. The credibility of the forward 
guidance approach suffers severely from the fact that communication of the horizon 
for forward guidance has changed many times. From the FOMC’s original statement 
“The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant 
exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for “some time” (December 2008), 
they moved to “an extended period” in March 2009. On 9 August 2011, the phrase 
was replaced by “at least through mid-2013” (the  first time that a date was 
mentioned, the so-called date-based forward guidance). In January 2012, the end-
point was extended to “late 2014” and in September  to “through mid-2015”.  In 
December came a move from date-based to outcome-based forward guidance: “at 
least as long as the  unemployment rate remains above 6 ½ percent, inflation 
between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half point above 
the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations 
continue to be well anchored”.  It is, indeed a daunting challenge to make this 
guidance “understood and believed by the public” (Yellen 2012, p.7).  
Assessing the relative impact of asset purchases and the policy stance expressed by 
the federal funds rate will be anything but easy for the central bank itself. How can 
the public understand this? What about changes in the composition of the FOMC? 
Over such an extended period of time it is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of 
the announced monetary policy on the economy. New shocks might hit the economy. 
The time dimension of those developments varies with the type and magnitude of 
shocks, the prevailing financial sentiment, the international environment and many 
other variables. Is it therefore not impossible to set the horizon for monetary policy in 
advance  (Issing 2002)?  Credible forward guidance,  and thereby the  anchoring  of 
public expectations, cannot come from announcing a fixed number for a policy rate 
but from providing a strategy which allows the public a kind of ex-ante understanding 
of policy decisions under varying conditions by the central bank. Announcing a 
specific number for the policy instrument,  the main interest rate,  for an extended 
period of time might be seen as an unconditional commitment, which carries the risk 
that any change will be interpreted as a surprise,  with the potential to  cause 
 
 
7 turbulence in markets and hurt the credibility of the central bank. On the other hand, 
“conditionality” of such an announcement might in the end give no forward guidance 
at all. There is even the risk that a kind of implicit pessimism about future growth 
might have an adverse effect (Woodford 2012).  
It is not surprising that the end of inflation targeting as the “state of the art approach” 
has triggered a discussion about other concepts.  
Announcing a nominal GDP  target path  is one of them.  This  should  fulfill two 
conditions. It must allow for identifying the exit from a policy which keeps the interest 
rate at the lower bound as long as GDP remains below target. When this level is 
reached the central bank will raise the interest rate to the level that is needed to 
maintain nominal GDP growth around a steady growth path. 
GDP (or rather GNP)  targeting had its heyday in the nineteen-eighties  (e.g.  Ben 
McCallum 1988). However, this strategy was never adopted,  in  spite of “some 
theoretical appeal” (Kahn 1988). GDP growth cannot be controlled directly. As a 
result, McCallum (1988, p.176) proposed adopting the monetary base as a variable 
that the central bank can accurately set day-to-day. The advantage of a GDP target 
over a target for money lies in the implicit reaction to changes in velocity. 
A strategy which relies on the interest rate as the control variable must be based on a 
model forecast.
3 In the case of forward guidance, this has to be achieved over an 
extended period of time. Is it surprising that central banks resisted adopting a policy 
procedure that depends so explicitly and openly on fallible forecasts (Kahn 1988, p. 
35)? This has hardly changed since then. Data on GDP come with lags and are 
subject to substantial revisions. It is also hardly convincing that such a strategy would 
be understood by the public. The message for the public might be that price stability 
(or low and stable inflation) for an extended period of time is of secondary importance 
or  is  even  being  sacrificed for stimulating the economy. Such an unanchoring  of 
inflation expectations could have serious consequences. Rising inflation expectations 
might lead to higher long term interest rates, thereby producing the opposite effect to 
3 A rising number of publications discuss the pros and cons of the three different approaches to the path of future 
key interest rates in forecasts – unchanged, market expectations, and expectations of the central bank itself. A 
new paper by Knueppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2013) concludes that this is empirically irrelevant for the 
forecast accuracy. Therefore, it might be challenging for the central bank to shape private-sector forecasts by 
publishing unconditional forecasts. 
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                                                           that intended. And we know from the past how costly in macro terms it is to bring the 
inflation rate (and corresponding expectations) back to a low level and restore the 
credibility of the central bank. 
Central bankers now regularly stress the fact that inflation expectations are firmly 
anchored at low levels. All kinds of measures, be it break-even inflation rates over 
various time horizons, inflation-linked swap contracts, or surveys, seem to support 
this belief. However, is there not the risk that, after such an extended period, low 
inflation expectations in a backward-looking way are just reflecting the notion that this 
regime will continue? Consequently, the situation might be rather fragile and exposed 
to abrupt upward shifts once doubts about the orientation of central banks arise.  
Concepts like the aforementioned  seem to forget how problematic,  and  even 
dangerous, it is to rely on data for potential growth, the output gap or the NAIRU. The 
severity of this crisis is obviously used as an argument for ignoring such warnings, 
yet the misleading character of real-time output data is well known. Orphanides and 
Wieland (2013) demonstrate that relying on monetary aggregates helped the ECB to 
avoid this trap. However, the different nature of this “balance sheet recession” might 
even strengthen such warnings. Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) have argued that it takes 
much longer than after a “normal” recession for the economy to recover on a 
sustainable basis. A policy which ignores this might lead to severe mistakes. 
Finally, what about the risks of GDP targeting – or any other approach of longer-term 
forward guidance – assuming Robert Gordon’s (2012) warning that the US has to 
expect lower growth for decades (for reasons  not related to the financial market 
crisis)  is of relevance?  (See also Council  of Economic Advisers 2013; Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2013) 
This brings us back to the fundamental question of what monetary policy can do and 
what it cannot do. In his famous presidential address, Milton Friedman (1968) argued 
that the central bank can control only nominal, but not real variables and should not 
target the rate of unemployment or employment. Is this conclusion now discarded? 
There still seems to be a widespread consensus that in the long run there is no trade-
off between unemployment and inflation and that inflation is determined by monetary 
policy (King 2005; Yellen 2012). 
 
 
9 However,  two consequences  then  seem  rather obvious. First, if the central bank 
promises more than it can possibly  achieve,  its reputation over time will suffer 
severely. Secondly, how convincing is any strategy for monetary policy which does 
not include an assessment of risks  to price stability stemming from monetary 
developments? The perseverance of ignoring an active role for money and credit in 
concepts widely seen as state of the art is as striking as the neglect of studies which 
demonstrate the importance of monetary developments (e.g. Papademos and Stark 
2010). Monetary developments are a kind of summary indicator of asset price 
developments (Meltzer  2012). A thorough analysis of monetary aggregates 
considering  also  e.g. the old concept  of inside versus outside money can deliver 
valuable information on risks emerging in the banking sector (Kim, Shin and Yun 
2013). Money and credit –  more than real variables –  contain information for 
signaling asset price booms which later might turn out to become very costly (Alessi 
and Detken 2009). Hence, a central bank which integrates the analysis of monetary 
developments into  its strategy will have a compass for how to deliver its best 
contribution to preserving  financial stability, too.  In  the first  place  macroprudential 
policy should take care of financial stability, and the success of this policy would 
reduce the pressure on monetary policy. However, an encompassing strategy would 
protect monetary policy from getting into  conflict with its goal to maintain price 
stability (Issing 2003). Recent experience confirms the validity of the ECB’s decision 
on its strategy incorporating developments in money and credit (ECB 2012). What 
should we infer from the fact that the ECB is (still?) the only major central bank in the 
world which seems to have a convincing answer to this challenge? 
This is a strong – albeit not the only – argument against international coordination of 
monetary  policy. There is no disagreement that cross-border flows may have an 
important impact on domestic monetary and credit aggregates (and vice versa). Yet, 
this makes the task of maintaining price stability (and preserving financial stability) for 
domestic policy more complex, but not impossible (ECB 2012). The idea that major 
central banks should internalize the spillover effects of their policies by creating an 
“International Monetary Policy Committee” that will “report regularly to world leaders 
on the aggregate consequences of individual central bank policies” (Committee 
2011) lacks any convincing theoretical basis (Issing 2012). Agreeing on a possibly 
wrong model for monetary policy could only end in disaster. However, the negative 
 
 
10 international spillover effects of “independent” national discretionary monetary 
policies could also be severe. 
 
 
4. Independence for the central bank? 
 
In the meantime the worldwide discussion on the need for a new monetary policy 
regime has been extended to the question of the appropriate institutional 
arrangement. The case for independence seemed settled with the experience that 
inflation correlates negatively with the degree of independence of the central bank. A 
huge literature had delivered convincing evidence (see e.g. Cukierman 1992; Alesina 
and Summers 1993). As was demonstrated by a global movement to give central 
banks independence, practice followed theory. This consensus seems to be 
evaporating, as was expressed e.g. in a laconic statement by John Taylor (2013, p. 
15): “It appears that existing law about independence has not worked.” This remark 
was directed towards the Fed, but his argument is of a general nature. At the same 
annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Allan Meltzer (2012, p. 3) 
even asked: “Can independence [of the Fed, O.I.] be restored?” 
What is the reason for this new discussion? In the context of the so-called “great 
moderation” inflation seemed to have confirmed the connection between 
independence and price stability. Figures for inflation continue to be on the low side. 
So, what has stirred this debate? 
Within present institutional arrangements, i.e. representing de jure independence, it 
is the politics of central banks which meet with criticism. John Taylor (2013, p. 15) 
sees a loss of de facto independence, and argues that it is driven by the Fed itself. In 
this context the fundamental skepticism of classical liberals resurfaces. “A central 
bank which is not required to redeem its notes against cash has a wonderful life; it 
can lend what it likes and spend what it wants without having to fear harm to itself 
and without any significant limitations except its own inclination” (Bagehot 1873/1999, 
p. 111). Classical liberals are deeply concerned by this “concentrated power” of 
 
 
11 central bankers and ask for a “government of law instead of men” (Friedman 1962, p. 
219 and p. 239). “Rules instead of Authorities” (Simons 1936) is the message. 
To exclude any discretionary influence of individuals on monetary policy, observance 
of a strict rule would be required. However, strict rules, take e.g. Milton Friedman’s k-
percentage-rule, did not stand the test in theory and have no support anymore. On 
the other hand, pure discretion has also been discarded as a policy which exposes 
markets and actors to a maximum of uncertainty (for a thorough discussion, see 
Taylor 1999). 
When the extremes of following a strict rule and pure discretion are excluded, the 
distinction between rules and discretion becomes a matter of degree (Taylor 2012). 
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy can be seen as a rule-governed or rule-based 
commitment (ECB 2001). 
“Rules with discretion” seems to be a rather vague concept. This is, however, not the 
case once  the basic idea is respected that the rule should be the compass and 
deviations from the rule have to be explained (Meltzer 2012). The policy of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank was an example of such an approach. Whereas the central 
bank missed its target roughly half of the time, the target had nevertheless a 
disciplining effect as the bank had to justify deviations from target (Issing 1997). 
“Even if it is true that the reputation of the Bundesbank ultimately was achieved by its 
success in fulfilling its mandate to safeguard the stability of its currency, its final goal, 
current policy continuously had to be justified in the context of its pre-announced 
strategy. In this  sense, the strategy contributed to the transparency, the 
accountability, and the credibility of the Bundesbank’s policy” (Issing 2005, p. 50). 
The Bundesbank`s monetary targeting can be interpreted as a commitment device 
(Beyer et al. 2008). 
A rule-based  monetary policy facilitates transparency and makes it  clear that 
accountability is related to the achievement of the final goal. Independence from 
political influence allows the central bank to take the appropriate monetary policy 
decisions. For an independent central bank with a clear mandate to maintain price 
stability, accountability is restricted to a “technocratic” task. Thus the central bank 
does not need to “justify” measures taken to preserve price stability. Quite different 
from “justification” is the challenge of  explaining why other goals like growth and 
 
 
12 employment are not neglected by conducting such a policy. This was e.g. the 
message conveyed by representatives of the ECB time and again to the European 
Parliament; the mandate itself is enshrined in the Treaty and cannot be revoked by 
parliamentary vote. This would be in total contradiction to the fundamental idea of 
“depoliticizing” monetary policy by making the central bank independent. 
This idea was formulated in full clarity by the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown in 1997: “The previous arrangements for monetary policy were too 
short-termist, encouraging short but unsustainable booms and higher inflation, 
followed inevitably by recession. This is why we promised in our election manifesto to 
… reform the Bank of England to ensure that decision-making on monetary policy is 
more effective, open, accountable and free from short-term political manipulation.” 
If  in the longer run there is no trade-off between price stability and goals like 
employment or growth, and considering that the effects of monetary policy decisions 
have a rather long time-lag, a single mandate –  price stability –  is the logical 
consequence. A dual – or even triple etc. – mandate blurs the final possibilities and 
therefore responsibility of the central bank. The government will always give priority 
to fighting unemployment and implicitly have a bias for short-termism. Under such an 
arrangement a central bank voluntarily or under political pressure is always tempted 
to embark on a more expansionary monetary policy.
4  
This is behind the distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” independence (see 
e.g. Cargill and O’Driscoll 2012). If the central bank’s independent status is exposed 
to strong political opposition, giving up independence de facto might be seen as an 
option to preserve de jure independence. However, this would come at the expense 
of undermining the fundament of independence for the central bank. 
The decision to make the central bank independent is a deliberate act of “self-
deprivation of power”, and by agreeing on such an arrangement parliament so to 
speak protects itself against itself (Issing 1993, p. 35). By its own logic this transfer of 
power excludes policies which need political approval. This is  needed  for all 
decisions with the objective of redistributing wealth. In a democracy such acts must 
be subject to parliamentary control. It is true that monetary policy unavoidably will 
4 In his great work on the history of the Fed, Allan Meltzer (2003, 2009) presents cases or rather periods when 
the central bank “coordinated” its policy with that of the government, thereby embarking on fine-tuning.  
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                                                           have distributional effects. However, one of the strongest arguments for price stability 
is that inflation hurts those most that are unable to protect themselves against its 
consequences – i.e. the weakest groups in society. In any case, a central bank must 
abstain from measures which are directed to have distributional effects, like giving 
cheap credit to special groups and not to others. Redistributive monetary policy is a 
complex concept (see Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2012). A central bank which is 
embarking on such a course will have to explain or rather justify its decisions  in 
political fora and cannot refer to “immunity” based on its independent status. This is 
probably even more true if a central bank in the context of its responsibility for bank 
supervision has the task and power to save or close a bank. This implies that the 
supervisor, i.e. the central bank,  will be heavily involved in  the  actions of fiscal 
authorities as providers of taxpayers’ money, which could result in political pressure 
jeopardizing the central bank’s independence (de Larosière 2009, p. 43). 
As long as there is no absolute (and absolutely convincing) strict rule, the people and 
personalities in charge will matter. Besides overcoming time inconsistency problems 
and anchoring inflation expectations at the desired low level, there is an argument in 
favor of appointing “conservative” central bankers, i.e. persons with a strong priority 
for price stability (Rogoff 1985). Divergent preferences of politics might lead to the 
choice of a “progressive” central banker in the sense that the person shares priorities 
of the government that give less attention to price stability. As Karl Popper put it: “Not 
only does the construction of institutions involve important personal decisions, but the 
functioning of even the best institutions … will always depend, to a considerable 
degree, on the persons involved. Institutions are like fortresses. They must be well 
designed and manned” (Popper 1957, p. 66). 
Central  bank independence is always under threat. From inside (de facto), from 
outside  in legal terms (de jure), and via appointments. The central bank is an 
institution of and within society. In extreme situations such as the insolvency of the 
state or a total collapse of the financial system, the central bank might lose “strategic 
independence”, which means nothing less than that principles of sound monetary 
policy are put aside.
5  
5 The case that the Reichsbank was independent in a time of hyperinflation in Germany in 1922/23 is sometimes 
used as an argument that independence is no protection against the destruction of the currency. The bank has to 
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                                                           It does not come as a surprise that preferences in government, parliament, and the 
wider public for independence might change over time (Goodfriend 2012 calls it an 
“elusive promise”).  A central bank can defend its independent status  only to the 
extent that it delivers  on its mandate, communicating its policy to the public in a 
transparent and coherent way – but also by abstaining from all measures which imply 
“de facto” dependence. Beyond that the status of independence – de jure and de 
facto – is exposed to changes in preferences of politics and society. “Not even an 
independent central bank can lastingly defend monetary stability against a ‘society of 
excessive demands’  –  in other  words, every society gets the rate of inflation it 
deserves and basically wants” (Issing 1993, p. 36). However, this is not an argument 
for the central bank to “surrender” by giving up de facto independence. 
 
 
5. New paradigm or recollection of proven principles? 
 
A broad consensus had emerged that price stability, sometimes defined as low and 
stable inflation, must be the top priority for monetary policy, that the independence 
(de jure and de facto) of the central bank was an indispensable prerequisite, and that 
inflation targeting was  the optimal strategy for achieving this goal.  There are 
indications that this consensus does not exist any more or is at least being disputed.   
Greater flexibility and tolerance for inflation, closer coordination with fiscal policy at 
home and internationally with other central banks, and a broader mandate including 
financial stability are the main arguments for a reorientation of monetary policy. The 
crisis – its causes and its consequences – has demonstrated that inflation targeting 
as the dominating concept has failed. All attempts at “rescue” have ended in a more 
or less meaningless approach (Issing 2011). 
In light of that, one might ask for a new paradigm for the conduct of monetary policy. 
But, learning the right lesson would bring us rather to a recollection of lost or ignored 
principles.  The new debate on the status  of central banks demonstrates that the 
be criticized for a very odd understanding (or rather misunderstanding) of monetary developments. On the other 
hand, the situation in Germany after the loss of the war was in many respects out of control (James 1999). 
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                                                                                                                                                                                     consequences of “rules versus discretion”  should be reconsidered  and  the 
independence of the central bank should be preserved via a single mandate and 
corresponding behavior of the central bank. How long will we have to wait until the 
neglect of money and credit in monetary (!) theory and policy will be understood as 
the major source of macro policy mistakes? Is it not strange, to say the least, that in a 
world in which money, credit and financial markets play a fundamental role models 
which give these variables hardly any active role are still dominant (see e.g Congdon 
2011)? And, how many speeches and papers by central bankers are presented in 
which  the  term  “money”  or  “credit”  was  not even mentioned? Considering the 
developments that have taken place over the decades, one should expect that the 
time of “monetary” macroeconomics and “monetary”  policy without “money and 
credit” will come to an end. Hopefully, this will happen before a new and probably 
even deeper crisis sets in. 
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